Unit 3.3: Governance of Pastures and Grasslands: Role of Local Institutions

Instructor: Dr. Hasrat Arjjumend

Field Practitioners: Dr. Hijaba Ykhanbai

This unit is quite interesting from different angles. Foremost is the setting of narrative encompassing traditional lifestyles versus modern technology intensive production. The unit will describe the contexts with a case study of Mongolia.

3.3.1 Dissecting the Incorrect Narratives

Let us excel the intricacies of narrative set against the pastoralists. Please read the texts below and answer the quiz questions.

Pastures and Rangelands are First Casualties

Despite awareness of the critical roles of rangelands in sustaining livelihoods of agro-pastoralists and ecological safeguarding, rangelands have felt the pressure of habitat fragmentation, land use change, industrialization, enclosure, privatization, militarization, and ecosystem devastation. The recent phenomenon of land grabbing has also affected the remaining rangelands and dependent pastoralism. Gradually, rangelands are being converted into other land uses or enclosed for exclusive uses under various national laws or policies. Worldwide, there is a common trend of declaring rangelands as wasteland or under-productive lands. In such context, pastoralism is often viewed as outdated and obsolete mode of food and agriculture production to give space for more intensive mode of agro-businesses. Thereafter, with the help of weak rangeland or pastures related laws/policies and by using powerful land acquisition or conversion laws/policies, countries either have given up massive rangeland territories to other forms of land uses or enclosed tenures or have restricted/ circumvented the grazing activities of pastoralist herders. Thus, by changing land use criteria, the results have been the exclusion of local herder communities, fragmentation of habitats, militarization of territories, and enclosure of rangelands. This has affected the sustainability of both rangeland ecosystem services and viable pastoralism and transhumance.

Defying the Myth 1: Pastoralism is Unviable 

The pastoralists’ own traditional and customary practices and rationale for sustainable natural re¬source management have always been ignored, and government policies still reflect the old colonial per¬ceptions and attitudes towards pastoralists. They re¬gard them as primitive and call for a transformation of traditional pastoralism, including putting an end to mobility. Mobility is a crucial aspect of pastoralism and coping strategies in drylands, and enforced set¬tlement, enforcement of modern ranching (as, for ex¬ample, the Botswana model) and promotion of agri-cultural production will undermine the pastoral pro¬duction livelihood system, which has been carefully adapted to the harsh conditions of dryland areas in Africa for hundreds of years (Simel, 2009). Scientific research has long demonstrated that through highly skilled herding, pastoralists maximise production by exploiting the variability of environments where other forms of food production are unfeasible (Behnke et al., 1993; Krätli and Schareika, 2010; FAO, 2021; Konaka and Little, 2021).

Photo Courtesy: Pixabay.com

It is believed that subsistence pastoralism is a sustainable strategy of livelihood and ecosystem conservation in the rangelands. Recently several studies have been undertaken to demonstrate that the nomadic pastoralist way (on rangelands) of livestock production with hardly any economic investment produces some of the most nutritive foods as well as other sustainable products. But despite such increasing evidence on the value of nomadic pastoralism, the dominant trend is to support intensive agro-business mode of development, even on fragile environment such as rangelands. Moreover, nomadic grazing (which is helpful to biodiversity, not detrimental) is often perceived by ecologists and conservationists as a threat to conservation. Many conservationists have advocated against grazing in natural ecosystems, especially in protected areas. This combination of market forces (agro-business) and conservation (protected areas) has led to a dramatic loss of access to rangelands for pastoralists.

Defying the Myth 2: Sedentarization of Nomads will Solve Problem

The twentieth century experienced a variety of concepts to settle nomads and adapt their lifestyles to modern expectations and perceptions (Kreutzmann, 2013). ‘When nomads settle’ (Salzman and Galaty, 1990), then obviously the ‘future of pastoral peoples’(Galaty, 1982) is at stake and has to come into focus. Kreutzmann (2013) questions: Is sedentarization the result of an inevitable modernization process or an adaptation to changed frame conditions? Does settlement in itself form a crisis of pastoralism, or is this just another approach by state authorities and development agents to cope with societal and economic challenges? Kreutzmann and Schütte (2011) argue further that modernization theory translated into development practice captured all elements of pastoral life and tried to optimize breeding techniques, pasture utilization, transport of animals and products, and related processing concepts to increase the value of livestock products. So, it may be articulated that the state and development agencies are more interested in marketable products of mobile pastoralists than in their survival at all. Capitalist development experts and communist central planners shared the same principles when it came to the settling of nomads. Political stability was aimed for, and modernity was the socio-economic rationale Kreutzmann, 2013). As Kreutzmann (2013) highlights, “the settling of nomads resulted in an early version of land grabbing, expropriation of inherited resource access and resource conversion…… For example, collectivization in its Soviet and Chinese interpretations and expressions has significantly altered and shaped Central Asian pastoral practices.

They are Hell Bent to Restrict Mobility

Næss (2012) showed apprehensions that official policies that constantly introduce reforms that reduce pastoral flexibility represent a far more significant threat for nomadic pastoralists than climate change because they may result in the wholesale extinction of the pastoral culture. Despite the fact that the mobility by pastoralists is a strategy to mitigate the changing climate, mobility is threatened by land tenure changes that limit movement of people and livestock, e.g. privatisation of common grazing areas (Næss, 2013). While the underlying rationale is often noble, i.e. to reduce environmental degradation (e.g. overgrazing) and develop pastoral communities, the result is often negative and in some cases exacerbate the problem it was meant to solve, e.g. increasing overgrazing because of reduced mobility (Næss, 2013). So the policies limiting pastoral mobility may severely reduce their opportunities for dealing with the changes.

Michele Nori and Ian Scoones (2023) narrate that there is a convergence of institutional and policy positions across world regions. Pastoralist herding communities often operate through extensive, mobile and often transnational networks. National borders and frontiers often cut across pastoral territories, which are far from core areas where investments and state policies concentrate. Therefore, there is often a disconnect between pastoralists and the state, because pastoralists live in remote locations such as the mountainous areas and plateaux of Europe, central Asia and Latin America, and the semi-arid territories in Africa, in the Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula. Pastoralist communities are often a minority in their national constituency, and so have little influence on state policies. This makes it difficult for central states to serve pastoralists, but also makes it difficult to control them.

Hiding Behind Climate Change

Global warming and climate change are the realities of modern world. However, irrational hype and artificially built flimflam have suppressed many genuine issues on the ground. Massive illegitimate conversion of rangelands into industrial and mining uses, unprecedented land grabs, dispossession of pastoral communities from their grazing lands, grazing rights and common property natural resources are among a series of critical issues that need urgent solutions. Mining, real estate, energy, tourism, polluting, and other extractive industries have been increasingly occupying and degrading the rangelands and grazing resources under the hyped noises beating hollow drums for climate change.

Photo Courtesy: nrxfly, Pixabay

Scholars argue that pastoralism is being seriously affected by new environmental and social forces exemplified by climate change and government policy restricting movement and other practices (Chatty and Sternberg, 2015). To enhance herders’ adaptive capacity and reduce their vulnerability, policies that advocate flexible rangeland and livestock management are highly recommended (Wang et al., 2014).

Towards Solving Issues

However, resilience of pastoralist communities to the changing environments – ecological, economic and political – has great potential for protecting and conserving the rangeland landscapes or waterscapes. Varied aspects of pastoralists’ resilience have been documented mostly in context of climate change. However, resilience of nomadic pastoralists particularly needs to be studied in respect to drying water sources, changing vegetation composition, reducing fodder resources, degrading rangeland ecosystem, changing political or policy environment, militarization of rangelands, and alike. Of course, the scientific studies of pastoralists’ resilience and adaptation abilities would contribute to inclusive policy processes or reform meant for landscape conservation and management.

Documented scientific evidence will help to minimize policies and laws posing threats to the livelihoods and cultures of pastoralist communities and rangeland ecosystems by providing the data necessary to make informed decisions. This may reverse the trend of underestimating the value of rangeland ecosystems and pastoralist livelihoods by governance structures/bodies world over.

Representatives belonging to more than 100 pastoralists’ organisations from 38 countries endorsed a statement in IFAD’s Farmers’ Forum (held in Rome in February, 2016) expressing the needs and priorities of pastoralists. They said, “Pastoralism is more than livestock production; it is a way of life, a culture and an identity. We pastoralists are citizens, and our rights, culture and customary institutions should be recognized and respected” (Gomarasca and Nori, 2016). Gomarasca and Nori (2016) have further suggested that rather than regarding pastoralists as a problem, policy makers should see them as a major ally and indispensable contributor to the safe governance and sustainable management of sparsely populated, marginal areas. Efforts to support pastoralism need to be focused on the local area or territory, rather than on national-level policies. They need to build on the pastoralists’ own knowledge, traditional organizations and social networks; recognize and protect customary land tenure rights; and support herders’ mobility also through the provision of adapted services (Gomarasca and Nori, 2016).

Mandatory Quiz:  [Click Here]

Essential Further Reading:

Roger Blench (2001). ‘You can’t go home again’: Pastoralism in the new millennium. Overseas Development Institute, London. Download PDF

References Cited:

3.3.2 Case Study: Rangeland Governance and Management in Mongolia

In this sub-unit, we will read and analyse a case study of Mongolia.

With an area of 1.56 million square km, and a population of around only 2 million, all lands are State-owned under the Mongolian Constitution 1992. Under the Mongolian Land Law 2002, “pastureland” means rural agricultural land covered with natural and cultivated vegetation for grazing of livestock and animals (Article 3.1.6). The rangelands cover a large proportion of the country (112 million ha or 71%), but around 122 million ha of Mongolia is devoted to nomadic pastoralism: 4.6 % of this lies in the alpine zone, 22.9% in the forest-steppe zone, 28 % in the steppe zone, 23.3% in the semi-desert zone and 16.2% in the desert. Mongolia is well known for its nomadic herders, and even today 25% of the population rely on animal husbandry directly.

According to ILC Asia, “Mongolia's livestock industry for long has been a major economic activity and a social safety net for marginalised Mongolians, accounting for 10% of the country's GDP and 30% of employment. In recent years, however, climate change and overgrazing have led to sharply rising land degradation, posing a threat to the country's livestock industry. Largely open access regime has led to widespread environmental and social consequences - the rich expanding their grazing rights, mining companies grabbing pastureland and the poor herders losing their control of land. The overgrazing in Mongolia also stems from soaring global cashmere demand amid a lack of land-use regulations or pasture management standards.”

Following the collapse of socialist rule, Mongolia embarked on a revision of its legal system. The Constitution was revised in 1992, and through article 6(1) it allowed individuals to own private land for the first time in urban settlements. However, private ownership was prohibited on pastureland (article 6(3)). Pastoral land and other natural resources remain as state property or de facto common property. In 1994, the parliament passed the first Land Law 1994, which affirmed the right to own land as private property, and established land dispute resolution mechanisms. This was revised in 2002, giving greater detail on the types of land rights, and further support with the new Civil Code, and laws on Allocation of Land to Mongolian Citizens for Ownership, and Land Privatisation. Special status is given to pastureland, recognised as ‘common tenure land’ and available for collective management. The status acknowledges a legacy of herding through the co-management of land based around kinship systems. The use of pasturelands as a common pool resource has survived multiple power structures in Mongolia, although conflict has emerged in the shift to a free market economy, particularly because of the growth of mining. As a result, some community-based development and participatory land management programmes have emerged, acknowledging customary systems by government and donors. Under the Ministry for Construction and Urban Development, the Agency for Land Administration and Management, Geodesy and Cartography (ALAMGaC) is responsible for land management and the implementation of legislation.

Although the first land law was enacted in 1933, the introduction of collective production in the 1950s was the first major change from customary practice. A new law in 1971 introduced a classification of land according to its use, and the responsibilities, the obligations and rights of economic organizations and the administration were defined, and land tenure arrangements introduced. The Pasture Law of 2002 takes account of the changed political situation and deals with factors such as: individual ownership (by herders, economic entities and organizations) and group owners (bag) of natural pasture and areas for winter and spring camps; rules for use of grazing in emergencies; stock-raising in settled areas; rules for contracting grazing to rights-holders; setting up of inter-aimag and inter-sum otor [using distant pasture for fattening] areas; and granting of haymaking rights to individuals and groups of herders. There are three major periods of otor: (i) spring otor for grazing young grass; (ii) summer otor for developing enough muscle and internal fat; and (iii) autumn otor for consolidating fatness. There can also be emergency movement of large stock to grazing reserves in a hard winter. Customary grazing rights, however, remain powerful, and are a major factor when considering land issues.

Photo Courtesy: Pixabay.com

Community-Based Rangeland Management (CBRM) in Mongolia:

CBRM Communities Have Greater Social Outcomes

• CBRM herders use more traditional and innovative rangeland and livestock management practices. CBRM herders are more likely to reserve winter and spring pastures; cull animals in the fall; sell animals to reduce herd size; prepare fodder and hay for winter; take action to protect key resources; and monitor rangelands, among other practices.
• CBRM herders have wider social networks, which helps them gain new knowledge and information. Wider networks mean more people and organizations to rely on for help in hard times.
• CBRM herders reported higher levels of trust and reciprocity within their communities compared to non-CBRM herders. Trust and mutual support help people work together effectively to achieve common goals. CBRM communities also had higher levels of proactive behaviour—people working together to address local issues and reaching out to their local government to ask for assistance and collaboration.
• CBRM communities were more likely to have informal or formal rules about pasture management, mostly related to the timing of grazing.

CBRM Communities Have Slightly Higher Livelihood Outcomes

• CBRM communities had greater income diversity than non-CBRM communities. Although livestock and government payments account for most income, CBRM herders had slightly more non-livestock and non-government income sources. CBRM herders were more likely to have income from vegetable farming and handicrafts. Non-CBRM herders were more likely to have income from mining.
• CBRM herders had more productive assets, such as refrigerators or butter churns, than non-CBRM herders.
• CBRM and non-CBRM communities did not differ in total net income or livestock holdings per capita. This suggests that changes in management practices have not yet translated into higher incomes and improved livelihoods for CBRM herders.

This live session will take place for 60-90 minutes. Students are advised to attend the Livestream Session and interact with a legendary person having repository of pastoralism/rangeland experiences. Prerequisite: Read the Note Download PDF

Essential Further Reading:

Fernandez-Gimenez, Maria E. (2006). Land Use and Land Tenure in Mongolia: A

Brief History and Current Issues | https://www.fs.usda.gov/rm/pubs/rmrs_p039/rmrs_p039_030_036.pdf

Grazing Management in Mongolia | https://www.fao.org/4/y8344e/y8344e0e.htm

Mongolia - Context and Land Governance |

https://landportal.org/book/narratives/2021/mongolia

Ulambayar, T. and Fernandez-Gimenez, M.E. (2018). How Community-Based

Rangeland Management Achieves Positive Social Outcomes In Mongolia: A Moderated Mediation Analysis. Land Use Policy, 82: 93-104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.11.008

3.3.3 Role of Local Institutions in Rangeland Governance

Dear students, please read carefully the case depicted in the box below and answer few questions in the Forum.

Box: A Case of Cow Jails in Nepal

In the hills of Nepal there are some remarkable ways people manage irrigation systems. For her book “Governing the Commons”, when Elinor Ostrom performed field work in the 1990s she noticed an enclosed field with a domesticated cow in the center of a village. Her Nepali colleagues explained that this was a kind of “cow jail.” If three adult members of the local irrigation system agreed that a village member had not followed the irrigation rules, they could confiscate a cow from the offender. These rules were related to how much water a farmer was allowed to take from the irrigation system and how much labor was to be contributed to maintaining the canals of the irrigation system. In these small communities everybody will recognize the cow. Thus, if your cow is grazing in the center of the village, everybody knows you are cheating the community by either taking more than your fair share of water or by not contributing sufficient labor to maintaining the irrigation infrastructure. Moreover, people in the community could milk the cow—a sort of payment for the water or labor that they lost to the guilty farmer. Once the farmer has paid a fee (on top of the milk he lost from his jailed cow) the cow would be released and returned to the owner. Needless to say, most members of the irrigation system prefer to follow the rules rather than being embarrassed in this way.

Adapted from: Anderies, J.M. and Janssen, M.A. (2013). Sustaining the Commons. Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Arizona, USA. http://sustainingthecommons.asu.edu

Q & A (Answer in Forum P-001)

• Can we call such a punitive arrangement in a village an ‘institution’?
• Explain an example from your local area. It can be addressing any type of natural resource, common resource or open resource.

Answers and Feedback of Students:
M3 Responses Students3

What is an Institution? 

Anderies and Janssen (2013) define broadly, “institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions. This includes prescriptions used in households, schools, hospitals, companies, courts of law, village community, council, etc. These prescriptions can function at different scales, from households to international treaties. These prescriptions can be one of two broad types: rules or norms. Because rules and norms are essentially human constructs, agreed-upon or recognized by a group of people, they are not immutable. That is, individuals can make choices whether or not to follow the rules or norms. Importantly, their choices and actions have consequences for themselves and for others.”

In his book, Arjjumend (2001) introduced that village communities have evolved with certain traditions and social mechanism in a way that the development as well as resource use was balanced, culturally appropriate, human-driven and perfectly decentralised. People’s wisdom and inherent abilities to evolve efficient management systems were all that made the resource use and development sustainable and locally-controlled. In that so-called ancient paradigm of development, the “traditions” or “social mechanisms” survived because of its close fit to the needs, values and interests while knitting together the social bonds for common interest and mutual advancement.” Conclusively, particularly villages presently survive with a variety of institutions taking care of different kinds of management functions. There are the institutions emerged out of communities’ endogenous needs, interests, beliefs & values and innovations. 

Institutional Systems in Rangeland Governance

Let us read a case study authored by Anderies and Janssen (2013) to understand the rangeland governance in community contexts.

Case Study: Törbel Village of Switzerland

In Switzerland, Törbel village has about 600 people located in the Vispertal trench of the upper Valais canton. For centuries, Törbel peasants have been been growing in privately-owned fields bread grains, garden vegetables, fruit trees, and hay for winter fodder. Cheese produced by a small group of herdsmen, who tend village cattle pastured on the communally owned alpine meadows during the summer months, has been an important part of the local economy. To legitimize their herding and livestock grazing practice, they adopted a legal document 1224, which contains information regarding the types of land tenure and transfers that have occurred in the village and the rules used by the villagers to regulate the 5 types of communally-owned properties. On 1 February 1483, Törbel residents signed articles formally establishing an association to improve the regulation of the use of the alp, the forests, and the wastelands. The law specifically forbade a foreigner (Fremde) who bought or otherwise occupied land in Törbel from acquiring any right in the communal alp, common lands, or grazing places, or permission to fell timber. Ownership of a piece of land did not automatically confer any communal right (genossenschaftliches Recht). The inhabitants currently possessing land and water rights reserved the power to decide whether an outsider should be admitted to community membership (Netting, 1976, p. 139). The boundaries of the communally-owned lands were firmly established long ago, as indicated in an inventory document 1507.

Photo Courtesy: Alain GENERAL; Pixabay

Access to this well-defined common property was limited to citizens, to whom communal rights were specifically extended. The alpine meadows of Törbel are “commons” in the sense that they consist of a common-pool resource over which there are no private property rights. It is property held in common with communal rights.
As far as the summer grazing pastures were concerned (the common pool resource), regulations written in 1517 stated “no citizen could send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the winter” (Netting, 1976, p. 139). This regulation is still enforced today and provides for the imposition of substantial fines for any attempt by villagers to appropriate a larger share of grazing rights. Adherence to this “wintering” rule was administered by a local official who was authorized to levy fines on those who exceeded their quotas and to keep one-half of the fines for himself. Many other Swiss villages use the wintering rule as a means for allocating appropriation rights (frequently referred to as “cow rights”) to the commons. This and other forms of cow rights are relatively easy to monitor and enforce. The cows are all sent to the mountain to be cared for by the herdsmen. They must be counted immediately, as the number of cows each family sends is the basis for determining the amount of cheese the family will receive at the annual distribution. The village statutes are voted on by all citizens and provide the general legal authority for an alp association to manage the alp.

This association, which includes all local citizens owning cattle, holds annual meetings to discuss general rules and policies and elect officials. The officials hire the alp staff, impose fines for misuse of the rangeland, arrange for distribution of manure on the summer pastures, and organize the annual maintenance work, such as building and maintaining roads and paths to and on the alp and rebuilding avalanche-damaged huts. Labour contributions or fees related to the use of the meadows are usually set in proportion to the number of cattle sent by each owner. Trees that will provide timber for construction and wood for heating are marked by village officials and assigned by lot to groups of households, whose members are then authorized to enter the forests and harvest the marked trees. Private rights to land are well developed in Törbel and other Swiss villages. Most of the meadows, gardens, grain fields, and vineyards are owned by various individuals, and complex condominium-type agreements are devised for the fractional ownership among siblings and other relatives of barns, granaries, and multi-storey housing units. The inheritance system in Törbel ensures that all legitimate offspring share equally in the division of the private holdings of their parents and consequently in access to the commons, but family property is not divided until surviving siblings are relatively mature. Prior to a period of population growth in the 19th century, and hence severe population pressure on the limited land, the level of resource use was held in check by various population-control measures such as late marriages, high rates of celibacy, long birth spacing, and considerable emigration.

The Swiss villagers have experienced the advantages and disadvantages of both private and communal tenure systems for at least 5 centuries, and they continue to use the communal tenure system. Although the yields are low, the land in Törbel has maintained its productivity for many centuries. Netting (1976) associates 5 attributes to land-use patterns with the differences between communal and individual land tenure: (1) the value of production per unit of land is low, (2) the frequency of dependability of use or yield is low, (3) the possibility of improvement or intensification is low, (4) a large territory is needed for effective use, and (5) relatively large groups are required for capital-intensive activities.

Adapted from: Anderies and Janssen (2013)

Let us read another case study from Himachal Pradesh, India.

Case Study: Gaddi Nomadis Pastoralists

Not all owners of livestock own land, private or communal. Nomadic herders, or pastoralists, lead their livestock to graze around a large spatial landscape in order to be at the right place at the right time. In such cases, institutions have been developed to gain access to the land of various landowners. In Himachal Pradesh, no particular place in landscape is ideal for the maintenance of goats and sheep throughout the entire year. The only way that these animals can be cared for is to move them across a very large area with highly variable terrain. These pastoralists originally adapted their institutions to the harsh ecological conditions they faced in order to survive. They move their animals, goats, and sheep across a vast mountainous landscape within Himachal Pradesh. During the winter, they descend from the mountains and graze in the valleys and the lower elevation forests. The shepherds have made arrangements with farmers (who own private fields of land) to graze on the stubble left after a harvest from private fields in return for the highly valued manure of the goats and sheep. In the summertime, it is too hot at lower elevations, so the pastoralists move into the mountains around the tree line. The only way is to change ground with the seasons, spending the winter in the forests in the low hills, retreating in the spring before the heat, up the sides of the snowy range, and crossing and going behind it to avoid the heavy rains in the summer (Chakravarty-Kaul, 1998).

These seasonal movements are based on reciprocal relationships. The Gaddis shepherds invest a lot of time in social networking among themselves and with outsiders to provide access to grazing areas in return for manure and other goods and services. The informally-evolved rights of the Gaddis shepherds have never been formally recognized by the national government. In 1947, the Indian government adopted policies that reduced the shepherds’ access to the usual grazing grounds by building dams to generate hydropower and by providing strictly private property rights to farming communities. This has resulted in more concentrated areas where livestock can graze, and may have contributed to erosion in the forested hilly regions. The government has accused the Gaddis of free-riding within this commons dilemma. However, the government had not recognized the efficient system that the participants in this action situation had already worked out; in fact, the shepherds and farmers had developed an effective bargaining solution by trading manure for grazing rights. The shepherds adapted to temporal and spatial variability in their system by moving around the landscape in a particular, well-ordered pattern. Activities that hinder this movement pattern on the landscape hit the vulnerable point of this transhumance system (the seasonal movement of people with their livestock between fixed summer and winter pastures). When these movement patterns are affected, the shepherds are forced to use a smaller area which may, in turn, lead to overgrazing. Thus, the transhumance system is highly tolerant to seasonal variation through very specific institutional arrangements, but is extremely vulnerable to changes in access by social or physical barriers.

Adapted from: Anderies and Janssen (2013) 

From above two case studies, underlying factors required to govern the rangeland resources should be:

• There is a competition among the resource users to use grazing resources, water resources and land resources. The common property resources (shared communally by all right holders) were claimed by all the stakeholders.
• Community members evolved mechanisms to resolve the conflicts and deal with the competing claims. They devised solutions under stressful circumstances. 
• Institutions (structures having rules or norms) were strengthened or created anew. 
• Rules, customary or traditional laws were formed with collective efforts, and those rules or laws were followed by everyone strictly.
• Those who violated the communal rules, laws or mechanisms were punished.
• Without institutional and collective interventions, a system was not possible and resources management and governance could not happen in robust manner. 
  

Anderies and Janssen (2013) identified several tenets of the institutions in order to governing the rangelands:

1. Clearly defined boundaries. The boundaries of the resource system (e.g., pasture system, irrigation system or fishery) and the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource units are clearly defined.
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. Rules specifying the amount of resource products that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials, and/or money inputs.
3. Collective-choice arrangements. Many of the individuals affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in the group that can modify these rules.
4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behaviour, are at least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.
5. Graduated sanctions. Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local action situations to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource.

Mandatory Quiz:  [Click Here]

References Cited:

Anderies, J.M. and Janssen, M.A. (2013). Sustaining the Commons. Center for the 

Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Arizona, USA. http://sustainingthecommons.asu.edu

Arjjumend, H. (2001). Anatomy of Village Institutions and their Interrelationships in 

Bundelkhand Region of Madhya Pradesh. Bhopal, India: Samarthan - Centre for Development Support. https://shorturl.at/18vaU

Netting, R. (1976). What alpine peasants have in common: observations on communal 

tenure in a swiss village? Human Ecology, 4: 135–146.

Further Reading:

Acheson, J. (2003). Capturing the commons: devising institutions to manage the 

maine lobster industry. University Press of New England.

Chakravarty-Kaul, M. (1998). Transhumance and customary pastoral right in

Himachal Pradesh: claiming the high pastures for Gaddis. Mountain Research and Development, 18: 5–17.

International Association for the Study of the Commons | www.iasc-commons.org

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective

action. Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press.

Siripurapu, K.K. (2023). The Traditional Sheep Penning System: An Exploratory 

Study on Farmers’ Preferences, Farmer-Pastoralist Relationships and Economics of Sheep Penning in Telangana, India. Pastures & Pastoralism, 01: 64-92. https://doi.org/10.33002/pp0105

Wrap Up the Unit 3.3: Make Notes and Post in Forum P-001

• In your short note, please highlight what new thing you have learnt from lesson written above in Unit 3.3?
• Can you sum up in one paragraph your new idea to add to rangeland governance?

Answer and Feedback of Students:

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